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FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW 
 
To Sign or not to Sign? A Conundrum of Vietnam’s Accession to the ICSID+ 
 
Chau Huy Quang* and Professor Umut Turksen** 
 
Introduction and background 
 
Vietnam has pursued a policy to impose a single national dispute settlement mechanism for 
investment disputes. However, as the Vietnamese economy has liberalised and integrating 
internationally, this approach is no longer suitable for Vietnam’s present needs. Indeed this is 
one of the primary reasons why Vietnam has faced difficulty in fostering the confidence in its 
investment environment for foreign investors. Thus, consistency, transparency and 
predictability (including recognising foreign awards) have been challenging issues for 
Vietnam. Most foreign direct investment in Vietnam comes from developed countries, and 
most of the 167 states and territories that have adopted ISDS-style mechanisms are developed 
nations. As such, the ICSID Convention ought to be seen as a necessity, taking into account 
the particular context of Vietnam’s legal, economic and political realities. In this context, the 
article provides a critical analysis of the legal developments pertaining to investment disputes 
in Vietnam, and evaluates the comparative merits of the arguments for and against Vietnam’s 
accession to the ICSID. In doing so, it concludes that Vietnam ought to accede to the ICSID 
immediately, albeit with a number of reservation as permitted under the ICSID Convention. 
 
This article aims to address the pending issues weighing on Vietnam as to its accession to the 
ICSID Convention; and whether there is a sufficient case for the state to proceed with 
ratification. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was 
established in 1966 in Washington D.C. as a part of the World Bank pursuant to the Washington 
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Convention,1 for the settlement of investment disputes between the states and investors of other 
states.2 It has the largest amount of state signatories compared to other similar conventions,3 
which has led to it becoming the most popular multilateral arbitration regime in the world.4 
ICSID provides a mechanism through which investment disputes between states are resolved, 
and which is utilised through a variety of bilateral investment treaties, free trade agreements or 
agreements on promotion and protection of the investment between countries.5 As a reflection 
of its popularity, ICSID has handled the majority of all known international investments 
disputes,6 and as of December 31, 2018, had a registered caseload of 706 cases, the vast 
majority of which had been adjudicated through arbitration.7 The overall “ICSID mechanism” 
for arbitration can be categorised into two sub-mechanisms: (i) ICSID Convention arbitration 
and (ii) ICSID Additional Facility arbitration. This article will primarily address the former. 
As the names imply, where the state and the investor’s host state have ratified the ICSID 
Convention, the parties may avail themselves of the investment arbitration procedures under 
the ICSID Convention, provided the requisite consent to such process (e.g., in an investment 
treaty as a written agreement to arbitrate) exists.8  
With respect to ICSID Convention arbitrations, one of the procedural facets that has positioned 
it as a leading institution devoted to international investment dispute settlement is that an award 
rendered under the ICSID Convention is enforceable as a binding judgment in every ICSID 
member state.9 This has been enshrined under Articles 53 and 54 of the ICSID Convention. In 
particular, Article 53(1) prevents any level of appeal to an arbitration award (unless permitted 
by the ICSID Convention), while Article 54(1) requires the state to recognise an award 
rendered against it as binding.  Thus, it must enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that 
award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. It follows that 
unlike the usual procedures for commercial arbitration awards under the state’s respective civil 
procedure or arbitration laws, Article 53(1) prevents a party from challenging the arbitral award 
at its national court on any grounds. The only available remedies are those prescribed under 
                                                          
1 This Convention sets forth ICSID’s mandate, organisation, and core functions. The ICSID Convention is a 
multilateral treaty formulated by the executive directors of the World Bank. It was opened for signature on March 
18, 1965 and entered force on October 14, 1966.  
2 The ICSID Convention, as of February 21, 2019, has been signed by a total of 162 signatories 
3 ICSID, List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention (as of February 21, 2019), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/List%20of%20Contracting%20States%20and%20Other%2
0Signatories%20of%20the%20Convention%20-%20Latest.pdf, 2019 (last accessed March 19, 2019). 
4 Gautami S. Tondapu, ‘International Institutions and Dispute Settlement: The Case of ICSID’ (2010) 22 Bond 
Law Review 1, at 89. 
5 Andreas F. Lowenfield, ICSID Convention: Origins and Transformation, (2009) 38 Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 47, at 57 
6 ICSID, The ICSID Caseload – Statistics (Issue 2019-1), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202019-1(English).pdf, 2019 
(last accessed March 19, 2019). 
7 Ibid. 
8 J. Christopher Thomas and Harpeet Kaur Dhillon, ‘The Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration: The 
ICSID Convention, Investment Treaties and Review of Arbitration Awards’, (2017) ICSID REVIEW – Foreign 
Investment Law Journal 459, at 464. 
9 ICSID, Special Features of ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Special-20Features-20of-
20ICSID.aspx (last accessed March 19, 2019). 
the ICSID Convention,10 and such remedies are exhaustive in excluding national appeal.11 
Should a contracting state violate such provisions, it would be in breach of its international 
treaty (ICSID Convention) obligations, which implies recourse to international law remedies.12 
The ICSID Regime and its application in Vietnam 
 
Current Status and the Road towards Accession to Date 
 
Vietnam has neither signed nor ratified the ICSID Convention and as a result, recourse against 
the state via ICSID Convention arbitration is not available to foreign investors.  Based on 
publically accessible information, Vietnam’s first serious proposal towards accession ICSID 
Convention appeared to surface in August 2003, when the Ministry of Planning and Investment 
(“MPI”) put forward a proposal to the Prime Minister (“PM”) (under Official Letter No. 5100 
BKH-PC) to prepare for accession to the ICSID Convention. The PM thereafter assigned the 
MPI to assume responsibility for and coordinate with the Ministry of Justice (“MOJ”), and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant state agencies to “study” the accession and issue 
its approval on the conclusion.13  
The fate of this initial proposal remains unknown; although, it appeared that no binding 
conclusion had resulted from it. This is because in April 2005, the former PM, Phan Van Khai, 
issued Directive No. 13/2005/CT-TTg in response to recognising the state’s shortcomings in 
attracting FDI, particularly in the field of planning, policy development and state 
management.14 In this directive, the former PM directed the MPI to (again) assume prime 
responsibility, and coordinate with the MOJ towards submitting to the PM plans for the state’s 
accession to the ICSID Convention — this time, with a definitive deadline until the second 
quarter of 2005.15 Following this, it was from mid-2005 onwards where positive considerations 
were articulated within the MOJ for Vietnam’s accession to the ICSID Convention.16  
Notwithstanding such initial considerations, and despite the MOJ having recognised that the 
increase of potential investment disputes is unavoidable in Vietnam’s path towards global 
                                                          
10 Being Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the ICSID Convention, setting forth procedures for interpretation, rectification 
and annulment of the award respectively.  
11 Aron Broches, Awards Rendered Pursuant to the ICSID Convention: Binding Force, Finality, Recognition, 
Enforcement, Execution, ICSID REVIEW – (1987) Foreign Investment Law Journal 287, at 288,  
12 Charles Vuylsteke, Foreign Investment Protection and ICSID Arbitration, 42 Georgia Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 343, at 360  
13 Directive No. 4653/VPCP-QHQT, Government Office, September 24, 2003. While this directive referred to 
Official Letter No. 5100 BKH-PC, such (internal) letter has not been publically disclosed. 
14 Directive No. 13/2005/CT-TTg on the measures for creating a new transformation in attracting foreign direct 
investment into Vietnam, The Prime Minister, April 8, 2005 (“Directive No. 13/2005/CT-TTg”).  
15 Directive No. 13/2005/CT-TTg, Section II.1(k). 
16 For example, the former Director of the Department of International Law of MOJ had publically raised the 
consideration of early accession by Vietnam to the ICSID Convention: Hoang Phuoc Hiep, Vietnam Law & Legal 
Forum, Reforming the legal system to meet the nation’s WTO commitments, 
http://vietnamlawmagazine.vn/reforming-the-legal-system-to-meet-the-nations-wto-commitments-3220.html, 
December 25, 2006 (last accessed March 19, 2019). 
integration,17 the proposal awaits a conclusive decision from the MOJ and/or MPI.18 Only 
limited information is available as to the status of the state’s potential signing or ratification.19 
It can be observed that one of the reasons why Vietnam has been reluctant to proceed with 
ratification is the preservation of the state’s sovereignty.20 If this is the rationale, then it appears 
such sentiment has remained steadfast since 2003. Nevertheless, recent events have provided 
some hope that the preservation of sovereignty may not be a resolute position — particularly 
with an economic payoff. For instance, note Vietnam’s negotiations towards signing the Draft 
EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement (“Draft EVIPA”) and more significantly (on 
November 12, 2018), the National Assembly’s ratification of the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”) in which for the former, the 
ISDS provisions bear some similarity to that of the ICSID Convention. 
Arguments for Vietnam’s accession to the ICSID 
 
There are generally two arguments cited in favor of ratification of the ICSID Convention, both 
of which are not necessarily from a legal perspective but rather support ratification on political 
and/or economic grounds.  
 
Development of political and foreign relations 
 
The creation of treaties and international agreements have the effect of improving relations on 
both the state and individual levels, including citizens and corporations.21 Whilst Vietnam has 
been increasingly active in the formation of these agreements, the existing limitation is that 
that the preferred method of settling investment disputes, being ICSID Convention arbitration, 
is inaccessible within Vietnam. It is arguable that this reservation undermines the perceived 
commitment of Vietnam to the terms of the treaties and international agreements because the 
protection provided through the ICSID Convention, at a conceptual level, represents and 
symbolises the respect between the agreed states on investment promotion and development.22 
Notably, some of Vietnam’s peers in the region have ratified the Convention, such as China 
and Indonesia.  
 
This is an important issue, as the treatment of foreign individuals and companies affects the 
relationship at state level. Taking positive steps to protect individuals of foreign states through 
ICSID can demonstrate the capacity of Vietnam to maintain a consistent rule of law and 
                                                          
17 Mai Hoa, Vietnam Law, Việt Nam có nên tham gia công ước ICSID? [English translation: Should Vietnam join 
the ICSID Convention?], http://baophapluat.vn/trong-nuoc/viet-nam-co-nen-tham-gia-cong-uoc-icsid-
108845.html, February 14, 2012 (last accessed March 19, 2019). 
18 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Investment Climate Statements for 2018 
– Vietnam, 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2018&dlid=281549, 2018 
(last accessed March 19, 2019). 
19 Maomi Iwase, Legal Development of the Investment Dispute Settlement System in Vietnam: Issues on the 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Conference Paper (Vietnam National University, Hanoi), 2013. 
20 Id, at 544. 
21 Kyla Tienhaara, What you don't know can hurt you: investor-state disputes and the protection of the 
environment in developing countries, (2006) 6 Global Environment Politics 73, at 73-4. 
22 Ibid, at 74. 
integration with the global economy.23 Ongoing compliance and economic integration provide 
the basis through which international relations can be improved. These relations are built on 
trust and the rule of law, and it is necessary that Vietnam demonstrate a resistance to arbitrary 
treatment of foreign investment for that trust to be maintained.24 This can enable Vietnam to 
become an active member of the global community through demonstrating mutual respect on 
which future agreements can be based. Within an increasingly globalised community, these 
relationships will be important to the continued development of Vietnam25 and its status/place 
in international trade and investment. 
 
Attractiveness of the Investment Climate 
 
Foreign direct investment is one of the largest source of income for developing countries, 
including Vietnam.26 The ability to attract investors to sectors where investment is not based 
on natural resources is competitive between developing countries because of the potential 
benefit they may provide to investors.27 From the perspective of investors, the decision to select 
a foreign state for investment is based on a comparison of the potential risk and reward inherent 
within investment.28 An attractive investment environment possesses features that enable the 
success of that investment. The protection of that investment through international agreements 
such as the ICSID is important, as the foreign investor is both subject to domestic law and 
unable to participate fully in its creation.29  
 
While ICSID is simply a legal forum for adjudication, there are significant benefits in 
membership to the Convention, through the demonstration of commitment to fair and equal 
treatment of foreign investors.30 Investor-state relationships, as with any business relationship, 
provides the expectation of receipt of an agreed reward based on achieved success, together 
with accepted potential for one party to attempt to covet or make such reward inaccessible.31  
 
The current system of protection provided to foreign investment has yet to be tested through 
implementation of an arbitration award. While the potential of non-ICSID arbitration against 
the state of Vietnam is possible, the necessary capacity for recognition by the courts of Vietnam 
is unknown.32 Implementation of ICSID would require the necessary clarification of the law in 
relation to ISDS, improving the understanding of present law and providing known structures 
of enforcement. While Vietnam has seen continued growth in foreign investment, the lack of 
demonstrated commitment to fair treatment of those investors has the capacity to undermine 
confidence.33 Presently, there is no certainty provided to investors as to if and how their 
interests can be protected should a dispute occur. Without confidence and/or legal certainty, 
                                                          
23 Larisa Babiy et al., Should Mexico join ICSID? (2012) 88 Graduate Institute of International and Development 
Studies, 7  
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration's Engagement of the Public Interest 
Contributing to the Democratic Deficit, (2008).41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 775, at 779  
27 Babiy et al., supra note 3. 
28 Choudhury, supra note 6, at 780. 
29 Choudhury, supra note 26, at 780. 
30 Babiy et al., supra note 23. 
31 Choudhury, supra note 26. 
32 Civil Procedure Code (2015), Article 459. 
33 Babiy et al., supra note 23. 
there is a limit to the amount of potential investment because of the proportional relationship 
between a state’s rule of law34 and the volume of FDI inflows per capita that it generates (not 
least because an investor needs to be satisfied that the government’s policies will be sustainable 
to ensure the investor’s competitive advantage).35 This limit exists, as the reduced 
attractiveness either has the capacity to discourage the potential investor from investment, or 
diverts interest to a more attractive environment.36  
 
However, to attribute non-ratification to underdevelopment of a state’s rule of law is, arguably, 
a stretched analysis, considering that major economies (such as India and Brazil, which attract 
significant levels of FDI) have not ratified, while those Asian states with perceivably poorer 
rule of law records (such as Cambodia, the Philippines and Bangladesh) have ratified. 
Furthermore, whilst it is true that the extent of useable ISDS mechanisms is an important 
determinant of available safeguards for investors, this advantage is likely to only hold true in 
the extreme example where a state has no available ISDS recourse at all. This is not the case 
for Vietnam, where, by virtue of its multiple ratified investment treaties, aggrieved investors 
are still able to avail themselves of investment arbitration under other institutional rules or by 
ad-hoc arbitration. Accordingly, the supposed “cap” on FDI inflows for the reasons of rule of 
law deficiencies may be negligible, particularly if one were to consider only this factor from 
the standpoint of non-ratification of the ICSID Convention. It follows that, for Vietnam, the 
extent of correlation between ICSID ratification and bolstering the attractiveness of the 
investment climate may be negligible or non-existent for this advantage to be truly realised.  
The argument against Vietnam’s accession to the ICSID 
 
Restrictions on Public Policy 
 
A major implication of ICSID ratification is that accession would place Vietnam under the 
authority of a foreign adjudicator and may erode the notion of public policy. A state has a 
distinct character in comparison to an investor, in that the consideration of public policy is of 
greater importance to the development of any financial gains.37 This is complicated in 
developing countries in general, and in Vietnam in particular, where public policy is, often, 
directed singularly towards the development of the economy.38 Being bound to such an 
authority over the treatment of foreign investors, reduces the flexibility of the state to meet its 
                                                          
34 Two major bodies have ascertained and categorised an index to determine a country’s rule of law metric on an 
annual basis: The World Bank and the World Justice Project. The World Bank provides a ranking based on a 
normal standard distribution (ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5). The World Bank recently provided 
Vietnam with an estimated coefficient of approximately 0.07, giving the country a percentile rank of 
approximately 55.77. The World Bank, TCdata360, https://tcdata360.worldbank.org/ (last accessed March 19, 
2019). The World Justice Project recently giving Vietnam a score of 0.50 (ranking it 74 out of 113 countries, with 
the lowest score representing the country with the strongest rule of law). World Justice Project, WJP Rule of Law 
Index 2017 – 2018, published 2018. Available at 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2018-June-Online-Edition_0.pdf (last 
accessed March 19, 2019). 
35 David Kunsch et al., The relational effect of the rule of law: A comparative study of Japanese and South Korean 
foreign direct investment, (2014).19 Asian Academy of Management Journal 147, 150  
36 Babiy et al., supra note 23, at 85. 
37 Kate M. Supnik, Making Amends: Amending the ICSID Convention to Reconcile Competing Interests in 
International Investment Law, (2009) 59 Duke Law Journal 343, at 349  
38 Ibid.  
responsibility to their citizenry. This is particularly so considering that foreign investors are 
generally not obliged to take into account the interests of the public of the .host state. At the 
very least, foreign investors have some tendency to choose and exploit a developing state for 
investment where accountability to the public is lower (e.g., those with perceivably weaker rule 
of law), and where they may be afforded with more significant “bargaining power” over the 
state.39 It is possible that from these conditions foreign investors might actively seek the 
potential windfall from conflict.40 This is of greater significance within developing countries, 
especially where unequal bargaining powers may result in excessively protective provisions 
favoring foreign investors. The authority of a foreign adjudicator to protect foreign investment 
has the potential to require Vietnam to allow for a public harm in order to avoid any breach of 
its responsibility to those foreign investors.  
It is thus desirable for the state to retain capacity to apply the law to meet the current needs of 
the state. Protection of the environment, natural resources and other social goods will not 
always be possible whilst simultaneously complying with protection of foreign investment.41 
Forcing consideration of foreign investors to a position of primacy is undesirable for the public. 
The consequence of any dispute or award would cost the state significant amounts, which may 
in turn cause acquiescence to harm in order to avoid the loss of public funds from the state and 
taxpaying public.42 As the ICSID Convention creates state liability, it is understandably a 
concern for the domestic population because of the potential harm that liability may create. 
Perceived bias in favour of foreign investors 
 
A further common criticism of the ICSID Convention is that it carries a perceived bias against 
developing economies, in favor of institutional investors.43 Such argument, accordingly, 
counters the supposed “fair forum” for ISDS through which ICSID is intended to facilitate 
among states. This trend may to some extent be ascertained through the most recent caseload 
statistics of ICSID, which reveals that developing states are more often the recipient of (or are 
more “susceptible” to) investment arbitrations.44  Franck summarised the criticisms of 
commentators as to the ICSID system, including those that go as far as asserting that the 
“system is rigged” and that “ICSID represents the inequities of an international system biased 
against the developing countries”.45 However, despite these criticisms, proponents of the 
ICSID system have argued that the perceived bias were generally a result of the state’s internal 
political circumstances, which are reflective of the positions of only a small handful of states, 
and is reflective of a general consensus.46  
 
                                                          
39 Yulia Levashova, The Accountability and Corporate Social Responsibility of Multinational Corporations for 
Transgressions in Host States through International Investment Law, (2018).14 Utrecht Law Review 40, at 43  
40 Supnik, supra note 37 at 345. 
41 Tienhaara, supra note 21, at 75. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Susan D. Franck, ‘The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in Arbitration Awards’ (2011) 51 
Virginia Journal of International Law 825  
44 ICSID, ISCID Caseload Statistics 2019-1, ICSID World Bank, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202019-1(English).pdf, 2019 
(last accessed March 19, 2019) 
45 Franck, supra note 43 at 828, 844. 
46 Franck, supra note 43 at 848. 
This bias appears to be perceived, rather than actual and empirical studies have not revealed 
any statistically significant correlation between a state’s ICSID accession status, the amounts 
claimed, and the ultimate outcome of the arbitration.47 In fact, Franck’s empirical analysis had 
shown that respondent states actually succeeded in their arbitrations at approximately twice the 
rate as the counterparty claimants.48 Notably, Franck’s analysis concluded that there was “no 
reliable statistical relationship between the developmental background of the respondent state 
and case outcome, whether as a function of winning or losing, or in the amounts awarded.”49  
Whether there is such a bias does not change the reality that a large proportion of these cases 
are pursued against emerging economies, where political circumstances and/or strength of the 
rule of law are continuing to develop. This is perhaps not surprising as these states are typically 
the recipients of economic exploitation by foreign investors.50  
Economic impact of resultant arbitration awards 
 
In addition to the number of cases brought against developing economies, one factor that 
challenges ICSID arbitration (or ISDS in general) is the requirement for the state to compensate 
the investor in the event of the state’s breach of its international commitments. However, a 
number of developing economies often do not have sufficient resources to settle such 
compensation, which are generally significant in value.51 In fact, even if resources are 
sufficient, it could be the case, especially for less wealthier states, that their economy may be 
adversely impacted or crippled through effecting the settlement to the investor. Vietnam will 
not be shielded from this impact, having recorded persistent and sizeable fiscal deficits in recent 
years;52 which could spell severe economic repercussions in the event of an award of sizeable 
quantum.  This goes against the “Fair and Equitable” treatment that is commonly enshrined in 
a state’s international investment commitments,53 almost to the extent of being a “standard 
clause” that is not seriously negotiated.54  
 
The Draft EVIPA 
 
For the purposes of analysing Vietnam’s readiness towards ratifying the ICSID Convention, it 
is important to consider the headway that the state has made in negotiating the Draft EVIPA. 
At the outset of, and throughout the negotiations towards, signing the EU-Vietnam Free Trade 
Agreement (“EVFTA”), the EU and Vietnam had intended to have a comprehensive free trade 
                                                          
47 Franck, supra note 43 at 859, 860. 
48 Franck, supra note 43 at 860. Note that Susan Franck’s empirical study was taken in respect of cases prior to 
2007. Such study has not yet been undertaken for post-2007 cases. However, unless there has been a significant 
procedural shift in the ICSID dispute settlement mechanism, we would not be anticipating material deviations 
from Franck’s analysis.  
49 Franck, supra note 43 at 852, 853.  
50 Leon E. Trakman, ‘The ICSID Under Siege’ 45 Cornell International Law Review 603, at 607. 
51 Ibid, at 613. 
52 Khai Nguyen, Asia Times, Vietnam has a debt problem, http://www.atimes.com/article/vietnam-debt-problem/, 
September 27, 2017 (last accessed March 19, 2019). 
53 Trakman, supra note 50, at 607. 
54 Even if it were omitted, the most-favored-nation provision (if incorporated) may enable the investor to avail of 
such protection anyway. 
agreement to encompass both free trade and investment protection mechanisms.55 This is 
similar to the CPTPP text. However, in August 2018, with the intention of expediting the 
ratification process, the EU and Vietnam decided to split the text into two: an FTA and a 
separate investment protection agreement.56 Accordingly, as of August 2018 the decision was 
to carve out the protections afforded to investors into the EVIPA. The protections set forth in 
the Draft EVIPA are relatively standard and align with similar protections afforded to investors 
under other investment treaties to which Vietnam is a member. These include national 
treatment, most-favored nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, protection and security, 
and non-nationalisation or expropriation.57 
ISDS innovations introduced by the Draft EVIPA 
 
The most remarkable addition under the Draft EVIPA is the distinct ISDS mechanism (the 
“investment tribunal system”) which the contracting states intend to adopt.58 Cited as a 
“radical” change to the existing investor-state arbitration mechanisms prevalent in other 
investment instruments,59 the Draft EVIPA provisions aimed to address issues that the above 
mechanisms faced. These include a perceived lack of independence and impartiality, ethical 
issues, consistency and coherence of arbitration awards, and transparency.60 Nevertheless, the 
specific innovations brought about by the Draft EVIPA remain a separate topic. Instead, in the 
context of ICSID membership, what is important is the agreed regime for recognising and 
enforcing investment awards. 
Similar to conventional ISDS mechanisms, the Draft EVIPA stipulates that final awards shall 
be binding between the disputing parties.61 Here, instead of merely deferring the process for 
enforcement to the relevant domestic laws, the Draft EVIPA mandates that awards are not be 
to be “subject to appeal, review, set aside, annulment or any other remedy.”62 Mirroring Article 
54(1) of the ICSID Convention, the Draft EVIPA will prima facie require the member states 
to recognise the final award as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligation within its territory 
as if it were a final judgment of its national court.63 Notably for Vietnam in the event it is a 
respondent state, there is an express qualifier in which despite these foregoing obligations, the 
recognition and enforcement of a final award will be conducted pursuant to the New York 
Convention.64 In such a case, the requirement that the final award be non-appealable or unable 
                                                          
55 European Parliament, Briefing – International Agreements in Progress, EU-Vietnam free trade agreement, 
October 2018, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/628248/EPRS_BRI 
(2018)628248_EN.pdf (last accessed March 19, 2019). 
56 Ibid. 
57 Draft EVIPA, Chapter 2.  
58 Nguyen Phuong Linh et al., Vietnam’s recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and preparation 
for EVFTA, Working Paper No. 18/2017, Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, December 2017, at 31. 
Draft EVIPA, Chapter 15.  
59 Elsa Sardinha, The New EU-Led Approach to Investor-State Arbitration: The Investment Tribunal System in 
the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) and the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, 32 ICSID 
REVIEW 625 (2017), in Meg Kinnear & Christine Sim, NUS Centre for International Law Collection of Articles 
on an Appellate Body in ISDS. Oxford University Press (2017), at 628. 
60 Id. 
61 Draft EVIPA, Article 3.57(1). Sardinha, supra note 59, at 668. 
62 Draft EVIPA, Article 3.57(1) 
63 Draft EVIPA, Article 3.57(2). 
64 Draft EVIPA, Article 3.57(3). 
to be set aside will not be applicable.65 While Vietnam has ratified the New York Convention, 
this qualifier is to be read together with the reservations that Vietnam had stipulated at the time 
of ratifying the New York Convention. Notably, the EU is not subject to such qualifier,66 so 
that Vietnam will not be held to the same standard as that applied to the EU (or EU member 
state) until Vietnam decides to accede to the ICSID Convention.67 
 
In any case, the qualifier only applies for a period of five years following the date of entry into 
force of the EVIPA, or a longer period as determined by the Committee should the conditions 
warrant it.68 Therefore, essentially, the Draft EVIPA has provided Vietnam with a five-year 
window to align its legal framework with the recognition and enforcement provisions of the 
Draft EVIPA.69 Considering the imminence of the EU’s and Vietnam’s signing of the EVIPA,70 
and the history of recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards (see below), such 
provision has arguably been one of the greatest concerns for Vietnam at the time of negotiating 
the Draft EVIPA.71 In order for Vietnam to move towards complying with its commitments 
under the EVIPA (if it were to be signed in its current form), it would need to immediately 
reform its legal framework in line with the EVIPA provisions, particularly with those on 
enforcement of awards.72 
The land expropriation reservation  
 
In addition to the obligatory recognition and enforcement mechanisms introduced by the Draft 
EVIPA, it is also notable that for Vietnam specific reservations have been made in respect of 
claims for expropriation of land; in which the state’s domestic land legislation would need to 
be considered prior to the determination of whether a claim can be legally pursued: 73 
 
Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, in the case that Vietnam is the expropriating 
Party, any measure of direct expropriation relating to land shall be 
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The National Assembly of Vietnam, November 29, 2013, Chapter VI.  
(a) for a purpose in accordance with the applicable domestic laws and 
regulations; and 
(b) upon payment of compensation equivalent to the market value, while 
recognising the applicable domestic laws and regulations. 
 
Claims for expropriation of land against Vietnam are not uncommon and in fact, some of the 
largest investment arbitrations pursued against the state were likely land-related, including 
Trinh Vinh Binh and Binh Chau Joint Stock Company v Vietnam, Michael McKenzie v Vietnam, 
and Shin Dong Baig v Vietnam.74 The land expropriation reservation is not unique to the Draft 
EVIPA, and such reservation has been incorporated in the ISDS provisions of the CPTPP.75 
The court’s role in ISDS: The recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
 
Judicial Involvement in the Arbitration Process  
 
Save for ICSID arbitrations, the extent to which a state is able to intervene in the arbitration 
process will be determinant upon the seat, or the legal place of the arbitration that is typically 
determined by the arbitration tribunal. In particular: 
(a) In an ICSID arbitration, there is no seat, and the proceedings are considered 
to be “delocalised” from the domestic procedures, such that the local courts 
are barred from intervening in the ICSID process.76 This is made possible 
by the contracting states’ ratification of the ICSID Convention that 
enshrines their international commitment towards such delocalisation. 
 
(b) For non-ICSID arbitrations, such as arbitration under the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, unless the ISDS 
provision stipulates, or there is an agreement otherwise, the tribunal will 
typically determine this. However, seldom is an investment arbitration 
seated in the jurisdiction of a disputant (especially of the host state), as this 
would compromise the extent of any neutrality that international arbitration 
is to attract.77 
 
It follows that the determination of a seat influences the extent (if any) to which the Vietnamese 
court is able to intervene in the arbitration process. Relevant to this principle, there has yet to 
be an instance in which the Vietnamese courts have attempted to intervene in an investment 
arbitration, or otherwise an international arbitration with a seat domiciled outside of Vietnam. 
Such attempt, should it be carried out, would have been futile from both a legal and procedural 
perspective, while its enforceability would see the state depart from its international 
commitments. It would not be acceptable to the international investment community if a 
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national court were conferred with powers to review in depth the awards in the context of its 
national laws.78 
Recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration awards 
 
Relevant for this topic (and similarly related to the seat of arbitration), the judiciary’s role in 
the “arbitration process” primarily comes into play at the point in which the arbitration award 
is rendered, and where the investor pursues measures to recognise and enforce it against the 
host state. In these circumstances, for the case of a non-ICSID arbitration, any challenge against 
the award’s recognition will be subject to the law of the seat of arbitration.79 If the seat of 
arbitration is not the host state (as is often the case), then the standards and procedures for 
judicial review in that state will not ordinarily be of concern. Further, it is typically in the 
investor’s interest to champion for a seat that is perceived to be more “neutral” in the interest 
of an independent and impartial judicial review). 80 
 
Notwithstanding such seat, and the provisions of the New York Convention that prescribes a 
general obligation on the member state to recognise the arbitration award as binding, the extent 
of recognition (if any) can still be subject to the member state’s national laws. In practice, 
awards in which a seat is designated in a jurisdiction outside Vietnam’s territory will be 
considered a “foreign arbitration award” - which may be interpreted as encompassing 
investment arbitration awards. Accordingly, such award will likely to be subject to the 
recognition procedures under the Civil Procedure Code (2015),81 in which Article 424 
prescribes the scope of awards that may be recognisable and enforceable:  
Article 424. Foreign arbitrators’ award that shall be recognised and enforced in 
Vietnam  
1. The following foreign arbitrators’ award shall be considered to be 
recognised and enforced in Vietnam: 
(a) Arbitration awards of a foreign country which is a signatory to an 
international treaty on the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitration awards with Vietnam; 
(b) Foreign arbitration awards other than those specified in point (a) of 
this [Article 424.1] on the basis of principle of reciprocity. 
2. Foreign arbitration awards specified in Clause 1 of this [Article 424] to be 
considered to be recognised and enforced in Vietnam shall be final awards 
of the arbitral tribunal that resolve all the contents of the dispute, complete 
the arbitral procedures and are effective. 
3. Foreign arbitrations and foreign arbitrators’ awards that are provided for in 
Clause 1 of this [Article 424] shall be determined according to the 
provisions of Vietnamese Law on Commercial Arbitration. 
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Article 424.1(a) of the Civil Procedure Code (2015) does not identify any particular treaty, 
although its reference is most commonly associated with the New York Convention. Nowadays 
the legal basis upon which a foreign (commercial) arbitration award is recognised is typically 
through this provision, in view of the expansive scope of signatories to the New York 
Convention. As this provision applies to any international treaty, it is arguably extendable to 
the ICSID Convention as well. Where no such treaty exists (e.g., a foreign award issued in a 
state that is not a member of the New York Convention), then recognition shall be achieved on 
a “reciprocity” basis. To date, there has been no clear guidance as to the elements to which a 
court is required to be satisfied in order to apply recognition on reciprocity grounds.82  
The Civil Procedure Code (2015) envisages a two-step process for an award creditor to obtain 
relief: (i) recognition of the foreign arbitration award by the competent Vietnamese court; and 
(ii) thereafter enforcement by the competent civil judgment enforcement authority.83 On the 
completion of these two steps, the award will be legally effective in the same manner as an 
effective decision of a Vietnamese court or a Vietnamese arbitration institution, and would be 
enforced in accordance with the procedures for enforcing a civil judgment.84 The Civil 
Procedure Code (2015) also provides for a maximum timeline of approximately six months 
until issuance of a decision to recognise (or not to recognise) a foreign arbitration award. 
However, while this Code prescribes specific procedures and timelines for each milestone, 
there is often divergence between the law and practice. It is not unusual for such legislated 
timelines to be prolonged for multiple reasons, including the workload of the court, perceived 
insufficiency of applications, requests for postponements and non-cooperation or attendance 
by involved parties. The timeline is also impacted by the fact that one level of ordinary appeal 
is permitted against the initial decision by the court to recognise (or not recognize) the 
arbitration award.85 
Grounds for refusing recognition of a foreign arbitration award 
 
One main cause of practical inefficiencies is often the consideration by the court of the factors 
that may allow it to refuse the recognition of a foreign arbitration award. In particular, the court 
must not recognise a foreign arbitration award if the award debtor provides sufficient evidence 
to the court to establish any of the following cases:86 
(a) The parties of the arbitration agreement do not have capacity to conclude 
such agreement according to the law applicable to each party; 
(b) The arbitration agreement is not legally effective according to the law of a 
country which is chosen to be applied or according to the law of where the 
award is made in case the parties cannot choose a law to be applied to such 
agreement; 
(c) The award debtors being agencies, organisations and individuals were not 
promptly and sufficiently notified of the appointment of the 
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arbitrator/tribunal and of procedures for adjudicating the dispute through 
foreign arbitration, or due to other plausible reasons, such agencies, 
organisations and individuals were unable to exercise their procedural 
rights; 
(d) The foreign arbitrator’s award was in respect of a dispute that neither 
disputing party had requested to be settled or exceeds the request of the 
parties to the arbitration agreement;87 
(e) The composition of the foreign arbitrator and/or procedures for settling the 
disputes adjudicated by the foreign arbitrator does not comply with the 
arbitration agreement or to the law of the country where the foreign 
arbitrator’s award has been made (in case the arbitration agreement does not 
provide for such matters); 
(f) The foreign arbitrator’s award had not taken mandatory legal effect against 
the parties; or 
(g) The enforcement of the foreign arbitrator’s award has been cancelled or 
terminated by a competent agency of the country where such award is made 
or the home country of the law that is applied. 
 
The burden of proof lies on the award debtor to establish the above (such that the court would 
and should take the foreign arbitration award on face value). However, in practice, the courts 
have employed their inquisitorial powers in shifting the onus onto the award creditor to 
establish that the foreign award does not fall within the above cases. Considering the extensive 
scope of these cases, this has at times proven, to be overwhelming for a judgment creditor. The 
court can also refuse to recognise a foreign arbitration award if it considers (i.e., without any 
requirement for the award debtor to submit the same) that:88 
(a) the dispute was not capable of being adjudicated by arbitration under 
Vietnamese law; and/or 
(b) the recognition and enforcement in Vietnam of the foreign arbitrator’s 
award will be contrary to the “basic principles of Vietnamese law”. 
 
Of the above, the annulment on the grounds of violating the “basic principles of Vietnamese 
law” has drawn the greatest attention. It is slightly distinguishable from the public policy 
provision under the New York Convention,89 but modelled on a similar concept.90 While each 
state would have its own concept of “public policy” in the context of the New York Convention, 
many civil law jurisdictions, such as Switzerland and Germany, have recognised them as 
reflecting fundamental legal principles or notions.91  
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Today, the term has typically been associated with a narrow interpretation.92 Vietnam has not 
enacted a specific definition for “basic principles of Vietnamese law”, and this has resulted in 
an inconsistent application among the courts. Unfortunately, this has led to some courts 
applying it broadly. This is done in order to consider any inconsistency in the findings of the 
arbitrator(s) during the course of the arbitration with a provision of Vietnamese law, to 
constitute a violation of such “basic principles” (even if the substantive law is not of Vietnam). 
In 2014, the Council of the Supreme People’s Court had attempted to promulgate guidance to 
the provincial/municipal people’s courts on interpreting such provision. This defined such 
principles as where “the arbitral award violates the effective basic rules for formulation and 
implementation of the laws of Vietnam.93 It further elaborated that the courts could cancel an 
arbitration award on such basis if:94 
(a) the court proved that the arbitration award contravened one or multiple basic 
rules of Vietnamese law; 
(b) such rules were not adhered to by the arbitration tribunal upon rendering the 
arbitration award; and 
(c) the arbitration award was a serious infringement upon the interests of the 
state, the lawful rights and interests of either party (to the arbitration) or to 
a third party.  
 
However, such guidance was largely ineffective in practice, as it was layered on another 
undefined term, thus creating uncertainty as to what such “basic rules” comprised. It did not 
resolve the complete discretion that was afforded to the courts in determining the extent of 
“basic principles of the laws of Vietnam”. 
The implications of this discretion was criticised among the legal and business community, as 
it became the most commonly cited grounds on which the Vietnamese courts refused to 
recognise a foreign arbitration award. This led to a variety of outcomes.95 For example, in Tyco 
Services Singapore Pte. Ltd. v Leighton Contractors (VN) Ltd.,96 a failure by the Singaporean 
claimant in obtaining a foreign construction contractor’s license under Vietnam’s construction 
laws was considered a violation of Vietnamese law (or the basic principles of it). Accordingly, 
the resultant award was refused recognition.97 In Toepfer v Sao Mai,98 the claimant’s alleged 
failure to mitigate their damages in accordance with Vietnam’s Civil Code was also considered 
a violation. Although the Civil Procedure Code (2015) procedurally prevented a re-opening by 
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the court of the merits of the arbitration,99 in practice this was still commonly carried out by 
the courts:100 
When considering the application for recognition and enforcement, the Panel [of 
Judges] shall not conduct a re-trial over the dispute when the foreign arbitrator’s 
award has been issued. The Court shall be only entitled to check and compare the 
foreign arbitrator’s award and accompanying papers and documents against the 
provisions of Chapter XXXV and Chapter XXXVII of this [Civil Procedure Code], 
other relevant provisions of Vietnamese law and international treaties to which the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a signatory to form the basis for the issuance of 
decision to recognise and enforce such award.” 
 
The judiciary’s track-record  
 
While no recent statistics are publicly available, according to the Supreme People’s Court of 
Vietnam, between the years 2000 and 2014, only 24 of 52 petitions for recognition of a foreign 
arbitration award were successful.101 The reasons for this track record, despite the supposed 
effect of the New York Convention, and leaving aside the enablement of discretion of the 
domestic laws, may be attributed to two major reasons:102 
 
(a) First, the Vietnamese courts have a tendency to apply only the domestic 
laws, while neglecting the impact of international law. This is despite the 
fact that the provisions of international treaties are supposed to take 
precedence over the provisions of domestic law.103 
(b) Secondly, the Vietnamese courts have traditionally maintained a 
conservative view, electing to refuse recognition on the intention to protect 
the interests of Vietnamese entities — particularly where state-owned 
corporations are involved as the award debtors.104 
 
Notably, these statistics do not simply capture data from awards of investment disputes, but 
generally any foreign commercial arbitration awards. If it were only to cover investment 
disputes, then perhaps the record may be even worse. Considering the potential impact of 
investment treaties to FDI inflows, as well as the courts’ general reluctance to avoid direct 
application of international law in their legal adjudicative process, there is a fear that many of 
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the recognition and enforcement mechanisms introduced by the ICSID Convention may go 
disregarded. 
Should Vietnam accede to the ICSID Convention?  
 
Overall, improving the business and investment environment of Vietnam requires a highly 
committed and sustainable effort from the entire society, including governmental enforcement 
agencies, the law and policy makers, the judicial organs, and the entrepreneurial community 
(including domestic and foreign investors). In Southeast Asia, Vietnam has demonstrably 
become one of the most successful states in attracting FDI inflows since its economic reforms 
of 1986. The continued inflows have been a significant contributor to the state’s growth and 
position in the global economy, which was traditionally founded on agriculture. In comparison 
to its regional neighbors, as a host state it has been said that Vietnam has surpassed Indonesia, 
Thailand and the Philippines in terms of FDI attraction.105 However, Vietnam needs to continue 
its development, and in order to maintain its economic growth, the state will undoubtedly need 
to implement substantive measures to protect the interests of existing and future foreign 
investors. Vietnam’s growth is expected to continue from 2019 onwards,106 providing a ripe 
opportunity for the state to enhance its economic position by improving the existing investment 
environment and capacity constraints.  
Any country that has tightly bridged its economic growth with attraction of FDI inflows will 
always be positioned as an “obligatory state.’’ This is especially so if that has state has acceded 
to international investment instruments in order to afford foreign investors recourse against the 
host state as an obligor (e.g., investment arbitration as a means of finality, or other means of 
dispute settlement).  In that context, regardless of whether Vietnam would become a member 
of the ICSID Convention, as a host state, foreign investors still have a choice of legal forums 
to pursue relief against the state in the event of the state’s violation of its international 
commitments under those investment instruments. Since the economic reforms of 1986, 
Vietnam has already faced a multitude of investment disputes with an aggregate quantum in 
the billions of US dollars. For example, Michael McKenzie v. Vietnam evidences that even if 
Vietnam ratifies the ICSID Convention, it would not necessarily result in an increase in the 
volume of investment disputes filed against the state.107   More particularly for Vietnam, from 
a practical point of view it is not whether ratification of the ICSID Convention would aid the 
state towards capturing more FDI inflows. Rather, it whether such ratification will be able to 
convey a strong and positive message to the state to foreign investors seeking confidence that 
their investments will be met with economic, political and legal protection and stability.  
 
With respect to the latter, this is concerned with whether the domestic legal system will be able 
to align with the international standards that have been (largely) adopted globally. To that 
extent, as a popular concept, when developing economies such as Vietnam intend to ratify any 
multilateral or bilateral treaty, they must work towards reforming existing domestic legislation 
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to align with the international commitments in those treaties. This can be done prior to or after 
the ratification of international legal instruments (though the former action is preferred). In its 
current legal framework, Vietnam faces challenges in this respect if it were to ratify the ICSID 
Convention. This is because of the absence of any real substantive difference compared to its 
dispute mechanism, and given issues arise from practice, rather than theory. It is, therefore, a 
matter of allowing time to enable Vietnam to incorporate certain flexibility in its choice of 
forum (arbitration) in settling investment disputes with investors.  
 
Vietnam’s domestic law, including particularly the Law on Investment (2014), is presently 
open and does not give rise to tangible restrictions with regard to allowing a path to investment 
arbitration Perhaps of greater concern is the reform towards the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign arbitration awards, including future ICSID arbitration awards. This is not a recent 
area of concern, considering the existing challenges to the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign commercial arbitration awards, and the international commitment for the same in the 
New York Convention. Where such recognition is mandated by the ICSID Convention 
Vietnam will need to prepare its legal framework, together with the mindset and competence 
of the judicial authorities in their treatment of awards that are rendered against the state.  
 
Whereas conventional ISDS mechanisms had generally left enforcement to the sole mercy of 
the courts in interpreting the New York Convention, the ISDS provisions in the Draft EVIPA 
have suggested a recent breakthrough in Vietnam’s openness towards reforming its system for 
recognising awards. This goes so far as to pave the way for the state’s ratification of the ICSID 
Convention. The very existence of a five-year “honeymoon period” under the Draft EVIPA 
with regard to automatic enforcement of the award seems to suggest that this finality provision 
have been one of the major impediments in Vietnam’s consideration of ICSID Convention 
ratification.  
 
Hence, whether Vietnam should proceed with ICSID ratification will be determinant on 
balancing the advantages and disadvantages of doing so; although such analysis has arguably 
already been accomplished by the state in consideration of the Draft EVIPA. Although it is still 
subject to further negotiations, the domestic legal implications of the Draft EVIPA’s ISDS 
provisions are comparable to those that would be brought about under the ICSID Convention 
if they were to be ratified. This is particularly so of the ICSID Convention and the Draft EVIPA 
mandate that the arbitration award is to be final and binding as if it were a final judgment of 
the host state’s national court.108  Accordingly, if Vietnam were to accede to the EVIPA and 
its existing ISDS provisions in the near future, there would be optimism that Vietnam would 
be looking to accede to the ICSID Convention as well, not least because it would already be in 
the process of readying its regulatory framework to accommodate the EVIPA provisions. It 
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For emerging economies such as Vietnam, it is essential to formulate a realistic roadmap for 
implementation based upon an achievable timeline. While ICSID has published a 
straightforward guide to membership to the ICSID Convention (including in signing and 
ratification), which appears to be addressed to state players, Vietnam would still need to ready 
its existing legal framework for such membership.109 A detailed and clear roadmap will ensure 
that costs are minimized, for both states and investors. In particular, there needs to be a balance 
between the state’s interest in reducing its exposure to legal risks and the imperative of 
developing confidence for investors in the host country.  
 
As a matter of practice, a single dispute settlement mechanism is no longer suitable for 
Vietnam’s needs. One of the primary reasons why Vietnam has faced difficulty in being able 
to foster the confidence in its investment environment for foreign investors is because 
consistency, transparency and predictability (including recognising foreign awards) have been 
challenging issues for Vietnam. Indeed, most of the 167 states and territories that have adopted 
ISDS-style mechanisms are developed nations, from which a majority of investors originates. 
As such, the ICSID Convention must be seen as a necessity, taking into account the particular 
context of Vietnam’s legal, economic and political reality.  
 
The decision to ratify also gives rise to the question as to whether the state’s ratification should 
be qualified by any reservation as permitted under the ICSID Convention.110 In particular, the 
ICSID Convention would enable Vietnam to notify ICSID on the class or classes of disputes 
that it seeks to exclude from the jurisdiction of ICSID. Notably, unlike the permissible 
reservations for the New York Convention to which Vietnam had availed on signing, the 
reservations under the ICSID Convention only envisage those that seek to limit the category of 
disputes that may be submitted, and does not otherwise provide for treaty reservations.111  This 
has been achieved by member states in a few instances. For example, at the time of China’s 
ratification of the ICSID Convention, the state included a reservation that it would only submit 
to the jurisdiction of ICSID in respect of disputes over compensation resulting from 
expropriation and nationalisation (to the exclusion of other types of disputes, such as breaches 
of investment agreements).112  
 
It is worth noting that while Vietnam has since made a commercial reservation to the New 
York Convention, this reservation already purports to include investment disputes in general 
terms (as opposed to limiting certain subsets of investment disputes). Therefore, such 
reservation would not be pursuable by Vietnam for the purposes of Article 54(3) of the ICSID 
Convention. Nevertheless, one pertinent reservation that stands out is the “land expropriation 
reservation” which Vietnam has prescribed in the Draft EVIPA and the CPTPP. This 
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reservation, in essence, enables Vietnam to expropriate land in accordance with its domestic 
land laws and on the condition that compensation is paid to the expropriated party in 
observation of such laws. The inclusion of this reservation appears to be a recent phenomenon 
and save for some relatively recent investment treaties,113 it has not been specifically 
incorporated in Vietnam’s other BITs. The justification for this type of reservation has not been 
clearly elucidated. While such reservation is in line with Vietnam’s notion of “common 
property” which is associated with the state’s one-party communist regime,114 it should be 
pointed out that China, with a similar political regime, has not adopted such reservation.  
Therefore, to the extent it would alleviate the state’s concern over limitations to its ability to 
recover land on allowable legal grounds115 - and accordingly, remove the primary obstacle to 
ratification, it is suggested that Vietnam deposits its notice to incorporate such reservation at 
the time of signing the ICSID Convention. 
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